Bill concentrates his practice in the area of litigation, including Commercial Litigation, Personal Injury, Products Liability, Employment Litigation, Estate Litigation, Real Estate, and Arbitration. He represents a broad spectrum of individuals, corporations and institutions in commercial, employment litigation, collection, construction and personal injury actions. He has expertise in a wide variety of venues in Bucks and surrounding counties, and in the United States District Court. Bill also has extensive experience in Alternate Dispute Resolution forums, including participation in the American Arbitration Association, private arbitrations and private court systems. He is frequently appointed as arbitrator.
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On April 29, 2014 an evenly divided Supreme Court let stand a Superior Court opinion which effectively creates a blanket prohibition on discovery of communications between an attorney and his or her expert. On November 23, 2011 the Superior Court handed down its opinion in Barrick vs. Holy Spirit Hospital, (32 A.3d 800). In that case, Carl Barrick brought suit against the hospital and its catering company, Sodexho, for injuries suffered when chair on which he was sitting collapsed beneath him in hospital cafeteria. Sodexho sought discovery directly from one of Mr. Barrick’s treating physicians, Dr. Greene, who was also designated as an expert witness to testify at trial. The medial records were produced, but Dr. Greene refused to produce “Certain records of this office that pertain to Mr. Barrick but were not created for treatment purposes….” These records included communication between Dr. Greene and Mr. Barrick’s attorney. Sodexho moved to enforce the subpoena which was granted by the trial court. An interlocutory appeal followed.
The Superior Court reversed. Its analysis focused on Pa.R.C.P. 4003.3 which protects from discovery counsel’s work product and 4003.5 which limits expert discovery. Discussing Rule 4003.5, the Superior Court reiterated the Supreme Courts’ interpretation of the rule in a prior case which held that, in Pennsylvania, expert discovery absent cause shown, is limited to the interrogatories described in Pa.R.C.P. 4003.5(a)(1) .
The Superior Court went on to hold that written communication between counsel and an expert witness retained by counsel is not discoverable as it is protected under the work-product doctrine of Pa.R.C.P. 4003.3. The only exception to this blanket prohibition arises where the party propounding the discovery can show that the communication itself is relevant.
By William T. MacMinn, Esquire Reprinted with permission from the January 25, 2014 issue of The Legal Intelligencer. (c)
2014 ALM Media Properties. Further duplication without permission is prohibited.
Of all the steps involved in litigating an action, one of the most important is correctly identifying the opposing party. While this step may seem to be the most obvious part of the process, misidentifying the defendant can prove fatal to the underlying cause of action—and this particularly is true where the defendant, unbeknownst to a lawyer and his or her client, dies before legal proceedings begin. Even though the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure permit a party “at any time [to] change the form of action, correct the name of a party or amend his pleading,” the door to this liberal right to amend slams closed once the statute of limitations on the underlying claim expires.
These principals create a trap for the unwary in situations where the opposing party dies before a plaintiff could, or should have, filed the original cause of action. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania long has held that “the death of an individual renders suit against him or her impossible where an action is not commenced prior to death.” Myers v. Estate of Wilks, 655 A.2d 176, 178 (Pa. Super. 1995) (citing Erhardt v. Costello, 264 A.2d 620, 623 (Pa. 1970)). Practically speaking, then, any complaint filed against someone after that person has died is a legal nullity rendering any attempt to amend such a pleading void.
By William T. MacMinn, Esquire Reprinted with permission from August 13, 2013 issue of The Legal Intelligencer. (c)
2013 ALM Media Properties. Further duplication without permission is prohibited.
But He Asked Me First!
Is that a good defense to an alleged breach of a non-solicitation agreement? In a recent decision a Pennsylvania trial court said that it was.
In Marino, Robinson & Associates, Inc. v. Robinson, 2013 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec LEXIS 18 (Jan 2013) Judge Wettick of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas entered summary judgment dismissing the case against Defendant who allegedly violated a non-solicitation clause. Plaintiff acquired Defendant’s accounting practice. The contract signed by the parties included clauses prohibiting Defendant from competing with the Plaintiff or soliciting any of her former clients. The non-compete was not implicated in the case because, while the Defendant provided competing accounting services, she did so outside of the geographic limits imposed by the covenant. However, she provided those services to several of her former clients, each of whom unilaterally approached her and asked her to continue on as their accountant. Plaintiff alleged that by providing services to these former clients, the Defendant violated the non-solicitation clause of the contract which prohibited Defendant from “Solicit(ing) in any manner any past clients … for a period of ten (10) years from closing”. The Court, following cases decided in other states, agreed with the Defendant that she was not required to turn away former clients who, unsolicited, approached her to request that she provide services. The Court held that solicitation required conduct on the part of the Defendant designed to awaken or incite the desired action in the former client. Where, as in this case, the former client approached the Defendant unilaterally, the Defendant did not violate the non-solicitation clause.
A similar result obtained in Meyer-Chatfield v. Century Bus. Servicing, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 2d 514, 517-518 (E.D. Pa. 2010) where the Court decided that the meaning of the word “solicit” was not ambiguous and applied the parole evidence rule to bar evidence regarding the meaning of the term. In Meyer-Chatfield, Plaintiff’s Vice-President of Sales and Marketing left his employment with Plaintiff and accepted a similar position with Defendant. An agreement, which included non-solicitation provisions, was negotiated between the parties. Shortly thereafter the parties engaged in negotiations for the acquisition of Plaintiff by Defendant. Those negotiations failed. Subsequently (and after he was terminated by Plaintiff) one of Plaintiff’s sales persons accepted employment with Defendant and took with him other employees (who were part of his sales team) with the result that several significant customers of the Plaintiff eventually began doing business with Defendant. Plaintiff brought suit alleging violation of the non-solicit provisions in the solicitation of both the employees and the customers.
The language at issue prohibited the direct or indirect “…solicit(ation) of any of Plaintiff's employees, agents, representatives, strategic partnerships, [or] affiliations.” The contract did not define the word “solicit.” The Court looked to the common meaning of the term, citing the Black's Law Dictionary definition:
"To appeal for something; to apply to for obtaining something; to ask earnestly; to ask for the purpose of receiving; to endeavor to obtain by asking or pleading; to entreat, implore, or importune; to make petition to; to plead for; to try to obtain; and though the word implies a serious request, it requires no particular degree of importunity, entreaty, imploration, or supplication. To awake or incite to action by acts or conduct intended to and calculated to incite the act of giving. The term implies personal petition and importunity addressed to a particular individual to do some particular thing."
The Court also cited the Webster’s definition of the word: “to entreat, importune . . . to endeavor to obtain by asking or pleading . . . to urge.”
The issue before the Court was whether the word “solicit” was ambiguous permitting parole evidence of its meaning. In holding that it was not, the Court reviewed Akron Pest Control v. Radar Exterminating Co., Inc. 216 Ga. App. 495, 455 S.E.2d 601 (Ga. App. 1995), in which the Court held that an agreement “not to solicit, either directly or indirectly, any current or past customers” requires more than “[m]erely accepting business [to] constitute a solicitation of that business.” A party is not required to turn away uninvited contacts of former customers. The Court also cited Maintenance Co. v. West, 39 Cal. 2d 198, 246 P.2d 11 (Cal. 1952) in which it was held that neither the act of informing former customers of one’s change of employment, nor the discussion of business upon the invitation of the former customer constitutes solicitation. Finding no ambiguity, the Court prohibited testimony regarding the parties’ understanding of the term.
It seems clear that the Court will apply the ordinary meaning of the word “solicit” which has been repeatedly found to require some overt act of entreaty on the part of the former employee designed to induce the former customer to action. Responding to an uninvited inquiry from a former customer, even where that inquiry is for the purpose of discussing business, and where that inquiry ultimately results in doing business with that former customer, will not be sufficient to support a finding of a breach of a non-solicitation agreement. Of course, doing business with a former customer may well violate the provisions of a non-compete clause and, in such cases, the Courts have not been reluctant to enforce such provisions. Although research has found no cases directly on point, the reasoning of the cases suggests that advertisements or social media posts informing the general public or one’s social media circle of new employment circumstances would also not constitute the type of targeted action required to support a finding that a non-solicitation agreement has been breached.
Why does it seem to take so long to solve simple problems? For years litigators have had to resort to the use of the cumbersome and needlessly expensive procedures to compel the attendance of a witness in interstate litigation pending in state court. The problem arises, of course, where the testimony of a witness located in Pennsylvania is needed in connection with litigation pending in another state, or when the witness is located out of state and his testimony is needed in connection with a Pennsylvania case.
In 2007, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated the Interstate Depositions and Discovery Act (the “Act”) which simplified the entire process. In October 2012 the Act was adopted in Pennsylvania and became effective December 24. It is codified at 42 Pa.C.S. § 5331.
The Act requires the Prothonotary to issue a Pennsylvania subpoena, upon the submission of a foreign subpoena. The Pennsylvania subpoena must incorporate the terms used in the foreign subpoena and provide the names and contact information for all counsel of record and unrepresented parties in the foreign proceeding. Service and enforcement of the subpoena are governed by the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.
Need to subpoena a witness in another state for a Pennsylvania case? If the witness is located in any of the thirty two states and territories that have adopted the Act, the procedure is just as simple. Issue a Pennsylvania subpoena; send it to your local counsel on the ground in the discovery state and off you go. The Act is the law in Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, U.S. Virgin Islands, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington. It is on the legislative agenda in New Jersey.
That’s all there is to it! In the words of the Commission:
The Act requires minimal judicial oversight and eliminates the need for obtaining a commission or local counsel in the discovery state, letters rogatory, or the filing of a miscellaneous action during the discovery phase of litigation. Discovery authorized by the subpoena is to comply with the rules of state in which it occurs. Furthermore, motions to quash, enforce, or modify a subpoena issued pursuant to the Act shall be brought in and governed by the rules the discovery state.
The solution is so simple one wonders why it took so long to come up with it and, once the Act became available, why it took five years to enact it in Pennsylvania? Enact it we have and litigators, their clients and the Courts will benefit from its simplicity.
Employment agreements, especially those for key employees which include non-competition terms, must be carefully drafted. What should they include? Here are eight (what’s magic about ten?) musts:
1. Define the Restrictions. The non-compete should, first and foremost, clearly define the prohibited zone by industry segment, by geography and by time. Because these covenants are disfavored in the law (certainly by every trial court which I’ve ever asked to enforce one of these agreements) employers must leave no doubt about the restrictions and be able to tie each to an identifiable protectable interest. The covenants are not enforceable unless they are required to protect such interests, and then only to the extent the restrictions are reasonable.
2. Protectable interest? Courts will not enforce these covenants unless the employer has an interest which can only be protected by the restriction. Eliminating competition is not a protectable interest but, for example, protecting customer relationships is. Consider how the particular employee could hurt your business and tailor the restrictions to provide protection in those areas.
3. Reasonable? A covenant prohibiting competition anywhere in the country is not likely to be enforced where the employee’s relationships were confined to one state or region of the country. Such a broad restriction would likely be found to be unreasonable. Similarly, temporal restriction should be limited to the time required to give the employer’s new representative time to meet and solidify relationships with the customers.
4. Don’t forget to protect your people. A well drafted employment agreement will include provisions which prohibit the employee from inducing your employees to move to the new employer. Losing one key employee is bad enough; losing three or four may be catastrophic.
5. What happens if the employer sells the business? Unless the covenant can be assigned, it is lost and the employee is free to compete. Restrictive covenants are important assets of the business. Absent assignability, the value of those assets is lost if the business is sold.
6. A tolling provision? It may take some time for an employer to learn that a former employee has violated the covenant. Litigation to stop that violation takes more time. A well drafted document will include a tolling provision which stops the clock from running while the employee is in breach.
7. Protect confidential information. The employment agreement should protect confidential information and trade secrets. Employees are often privy to sensitive information which is necessary to do their job. When they leave employment, that information should stay behind. Make sure that the employment agreement provides that confidential information and trade secrets will not be “used or disclosed” after the sale. Define confidential information as broadly as possible, but keep in mind that it does not include information known to the public or easily discoverable.
8. Make violation risky. The former employee must know that if he chooses to violate, it will cost him. The tolling language, mentioned above is one way to get that point across. Another is to provide for recovery of attorney’s fees if the restrictive covenants are violated and enforcement litigation results.
There is a large body of state specific law surrounding the interpretation and enforcement of these agreements. Make sure the attorney who you engage is experienced in this area of the law.
With summer just around the corner, employers are inundated with requests by students for summer internships. If your company offers such opportunities, taking a few moments to review the applicable regulations will help assure that the program complies with the law.
It goes without saying that a paid intern is an employee and subject to all applicable state and federal employment laws including those pertaining to minimum wage and overtime. Even if the internship is unpaid, failure to follow Department of Labor guidelines could lead to legal liability under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Department of Labor Guidelines
The Fair Labor Standards Act (the FLSA) provides, of course, that individuals in an employment relationship must be paid for services performed. When is an unpaid intern an employee? According to guidelines published by the Department of Labor, if the following factors are met, there is no employment relationship and the intern need not be paid:
The internship, even though it includes actual operation of the facilities of the employer, is similar to training which would be given in an educational environment;
The internship experience is for the benefit of the intern;
The intern does not displace regular employees, but works under close supervision of existing staff;
The employer that provides the training derives no immediate advantage from the activities of this intern;
The intern is not necessarily entitled to a job at the conclusion of the internship; and
The employer and the intern understand that the intern is not entitled to wages for the time spent in the internship.
If all of these factors are met, the Department of Labor will conclude that an employment relationship does not exist under the FLSA. In such circumstances, minimum wage and overtime provisions do not apply to the intern.
Different rules apply for governmental agencies and non-profit organizations. Internships offered by governmental agencies, private non-profit food banks and non-profit organizations providing religious, charitable, civic, or humanitarian services are generally permissible so long as the intern volunteers his or her time freely and without anticipation of compensation.
A permissible unpaid internship will include some or all of these features:
Factors which indicate an employment relationship (and trigger the requirement to pay wages) include:
Summer internships, paid or unpaid, provide valuable experience to students. Employers need only exercise some caution is structuring the internship to avoid running afoul of DOL regulations. The DOL Fact Sheet on summer internships is available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs71.htm