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Goods Tainted by Forced Labor
Reprinted with permission from Business Law Today April 2018.
The global fight against child labor and forced labor has been led for decades by the International Labor Organization (ILO). The ILO’s most recent estimate is that 25 million people around the world, including millions of children, are currently subjected to forced labor. Under U.S. law, section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 prohibits the importation of merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured, wholly or in part, in any foreign country by convict, forced, or indentured labor. This law gave the U.S. Customs Service (now the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)) authority to seize commodities imported into the United States where forced labor was suspected to have been used anywhere in the supply chain.
The Tariff Act defines “forced labor” as “all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty for its nonperformance and for which the worker does not offer himself voluntarily.” Products of forced labor include goods that were produced by convicts and indentured laborers. The ILO defines forced or compulsory labor as service that involves coercion—either direct threats of violence or more subtle forms of compulsion under the menace of any penalty. Goods made by child labor, defined as work that deprives children of their childhood, their potential, and their dignity and that is harmful to their physical and mental development, are included in the forced-labor prohibition especially when combined with any form of indenture. Such tainted merchandise is subject to exclusion and/or seizure by the CBP, may lead to corporate criminal liability, and could even support prosecution of culpable employees individually.
The Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (TFTEA) removed the “consumptive demand” exception to the United States Tariff Act of 1930, which was a commonly exploited loophole to the prohibition against importing products of forced labor. Prior to the new provision, CBP used the law only 39 times since 1930 to apprehend goods tainted at some point from creation to delivery by forced labor. Since the passage of TFTEA, CBP has issued four new Withhold Release Orders (each a WRO) on specific goods from China. Although 2017 saw more antidumping and countervailing duty orders and intellectual property rights protection activity under TFTEA, there have been no published detentions to date, although CBP has pledged to the U.S. Congress that more import bans under section 307 are forthcoming.
Reprinted with permission from the April 18th, 2018 issue of The Legal Intelligencer. (c) 2018 ALM Media Properties. Further duplication without permission is prohibited.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro interprets a very specific exemption to the overtime rules imposed by the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, et seq. (“FLSA”), but the Court’s language and reasoning have game-changing ramifications. The Court’s rejection of the principle that courts should narrowly construe exemptions to the FLSA turns decades of FLSA caselaw on its head.
The facts of Encino Motorcars are deceptively narrow. Employees classified as service advisors for a car dealership challenged the car dealership’s classification of the service advisors as exempt from the FLSA. The FLSA requires that employers must pay overtime to employees who work more than 40 hours in a week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). The dealership claimed the exemption under a statutory exemption that applies to car dealerships. 29 U.S.C. § 213. Specifically, the section in question exempts from overtime pay requirements:
Any salesman, partsman, or mechanic primarily engaged in selling or servicing automobiles, trucks, or farm implements, if he is employed by a nonmanufacturing establishment primarily engaged in the business of selling such vehicles or implements to ultimate purchasers.
Prior to the tax act, taxpayers who required additional cash for a variety of reasons, including buying our their spouse’s interest in the residence, would regularly refinance the mortgages on their residence for a larger amount. The benefit was that the mortgage interest on the refinanced mortgage could be deducted up to a $1,000,000 cap.
The passage of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act has effected a huge change limiting the mortgage deduction in this scenario, which may have a significant impact on parties going through a divorce. The new law limits the amount of the mortgage to funds needed to acquire a residence, construct a residence or substantially improve a residence. So, if you are refinancing for one of these allowable expenses, and stay below the $1,000,000 cap, the interest would still be deductible. However, in a divorce that is often not the case.
In a divorce, the party retaining the residence will have to refinance the loans related to the residence to remove the other party’s name. Often, this will be both a mortgage and a home equity line of credit. Moreover, the party retaining the residence often has to refinance for a larger amount to make a cash payment to the other party to “buy out their interest” in the house. With the new law, the parties refinancing the marital residence to take cash out to pay off the other spouse will be limited to the principal balance prior to the cash out refinance in terms of the interest that can be deducted. For example, if the principal mortgage balance is $300,000 and the party retaining the residence is refinancing for $500,000 to pay off the other spouse, they will be limited for purposes of the deduction to the interest on the $300,000. Interest on the additional $200,000 cannot be deducted. In addition, there will be no deduction when the mortgage is refinanced to now include the home equity line of credit. Parties are going to have to give more consideration to the tax consequences and resulting true cost of retaining the residence.
Finally, Spring is here! It has certainly been a long, cold, snowy, and relentless winter. I want to take this opportunity to wish all of you a snow-free, warm and sunny Spring. As an employment lawyer, I'd like to do my part to help all of you employers maintain a care-free Spring mood by offering the following Spring cleaning checklist, which can protect your business from litigation and compliance risks.
In my prior installment of this series (Family Law Tip #2), I discussed the substantial reduction in the allowable amount of mortgage interest which is now tax deductible on any mortgage taken out after December 15, 2017. The 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act reduced the deductible amount by $250,000 on homes purchased after the cut off date - capping the allowable interest deduction to mortgage principal of $750,000 (reduced from $1,000,000 prior to December 15, 2017). Beyond the lower mortgage cap, another big change is that, in general, the interest on home equity lines of credit is no longer deductible (with some very limited exceptions). This is true regardless of whether the home equity line of credit was taken out before or after the change in tax law.
These changes to the allowable mortgage interest deduction will have a bearing on the decision of divorcing parties as to whether to keep their second residence post-divorce. In the past, people often kept the second residence, in part knowing that they were able to deduct the mortgage and home equity line of credit interest on their tax returns and the maximum amount of $1,000,000 in indebtedness allowed for flexibility. In the advent of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, some will have to rethink this decision. If the expenses related to their vacation homes cannot be deducted, the cost to maintain the home will be higher.
While there was some back and forth in the various drafts of the tax code revisions, ultimately the deductions for the mortgage interest apply to both the primary residence and a second home as well. However, as stated above, the $750,000 cap makes it more likely that parties will not be able to deduct all of the interest on the mortgages for the primary residence and secondary residence when those amounts are combined. Consulting your attorney and accountant will help you to determine the actual increase in the cost of maintaining your vacation home so that you can make an informed decision.
Reprinted with permission from the Spring 2018 Issue of the Pennsylvania CPA Journal
My partners and I were retained for a recent case that highlighted the value of tax and accounting expertise in litigation. We represented shareholders in a precious metals business who were embroiled in a difficult intrafamily dispute. The work illustrated a successful marriage of lawyers and accounting experts in a very complicated commercial case.
A platinum recycling company owned by three brothers – I’ll call them O, S, and K – acquired an interest in a company in Gibraltar and another company in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Their creditor was a South African platinum company.
Trouble started in 2008. The company fell behind in payments to its South African creditor, and the brothers fought over their company’s future and strategies to repay their creditor. Litigation ensued.
Suits erupted in four different jurisdictions: in the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) in the High Court of Justice, Chancery Division (Chancery case), venued in London, England; in Bucks County, Pa.; in Burlington County, N.J.; and in federal court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
Brother S and the company sued Brother K in New Jersey for failure to pay funds due under a loan from the company. The loan was to permit Brother K to purchase the UAE and Gibraltar companies, and then to transfer half of his interest to Brother S.
In the Chancery case, Brother S sued Brother K for K’s conduct in the transactions to purchase the UAE and Gibraltar companies.
Brother O sued Brothers S and K and the company in Bucks County for failure to make distributions to him, for mismanagement, and for self-dealing. Brother K, as an owner of the UAE and Gibraltar businesses, filed on behalf of those entities against the brothers’ company for failure to return metal or pay funds due.
In London, the South African company sued the brothers’ company for $200 million in loans owed to it. It filed the same action in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
The brothers eventually settled the Bucks County, London, and New Jersey actions, as well as one of the federal court actions. However, the dispute with the South African company in the LCIA went to trial. The South African company won a judgment for slightly more than $200 million.
The South African company then filed a new action in federal court, alleging that the earlier settlements amounted to fraudulent conveyances made to avoid the $200 million claim while the brothers’ company was insolvent and without fair value exchanged.
The dispute required forensic accounting experts on both sides to present on several issues, including maintaining the entity’s status as an S corporation, evaluating the solvency of the entity, providing insight into whether certain transactions amounted to fraudulent conveyances, and assisting counsel with cross-examination.
The accounting experts evaluated whether settling the Bucks County case to preserve an S election was a viable defense under the fraudulent conveyance statute, and provided advice, reports, and testimony to explain the S election, the steps the company could properly have taken to preserve the election, and the consequences of losing the election.
The parties sought expert opinions regarding the company’s insolvency, and the date it became insolvent. With a $200 million judgment looming, the issue of insolvency was a matter of “when,” rather than “whether.” The lawyers and accountants worked together to determine the date on which insolvency occurred and how to present that to the jury.
The most daunting issue in the case was the lack of professional recordkeeping by the brothers’ company. This issue is too common in family businesses, even among those that have been successful. Experts were required to recreate financial information from the reports generated related to the insolvency and tax issues. The forensic accountants provided support in cross-examination aimed at challenging those recreated reports.
The jury was called upon to answer the following question: Did the settlements amount to fraudulent conveyances? The jury answered “yes” with regard to the Bucks County settlement, but “no” to the settlement of the dispute with the UAE and Gibraltar entities. The jury found that the shareholders did not engage in actual fraud. It returned a verdict of $16 million in favor of the South African company.
The creditor portion of this case required extensive use of forensic accounting experts who expressed opinions on both sides of the Subchapter S and insolvency issues. They assisted in devising strategies to present highly technical topics to the jury. Accounting experts on both sides recreated financial records, and wrote reports addressing the issues. They assisted in devising strategies for cross-examination, and they testified. Together the lawyers and accounting experts were able to present very complicated evidence in a way that kept the jury engaged.