AMM Blog

Welcome to the AMM Law Blog, a tool to help you keep up to date on current legal developments over the broad spectrum of our practice areas.  We welcome your comments and suggestions to create a dynamic forum that will be of interest to readers and participants.

 

By William T. MacMinn, Esquire Reprinted with permission from the July 27, 2015 issue of The Legal Intelligencer. (c) 2015 ALM Media Properties. Further duplication without permission is prohibited.

The Superior Court confirmed in the recent decision of Drake Manufacturing Company, Inc. v. Polyflow, Inc., 109 A.3d 250 (Pa. Super. 2015), that a foreign corporation doing business in Pennsylvania must be registered pursuant to 15 Pa.C.S.A. §4141(a) in order to maintain any litigation or recover any damages in the Commonwealth (15 Pa.C.S.A. §4141(a) is now enacted at 15 Pa.C.S.A. §411(a)).  The Drake case is an instructive and cautionary tale because the Defendant in that case admitted contractual liability for non-payment, but defended the case solely on the lack of capacity issue. There was no doubt that the Plaintiff was a foreign corporation doing business in Pennsylvania and had not registered as required by Pennsylvania’s Business Corporation Law.  Nevertheless, even after many years and several opportunities to obtain the Certificate of Registration, Plaintiff failed to do so until three weeks after winning a verdict in the case.

Defendant properly pled the lack of capacity defense in its Answer, renewed the argument in a motion for non-suit at the close of Plaintiff’s case, and filed post-trial motions requesting judgment n.o.v.  Three and a half years passed from the time of Plaintiff’s complaint until verdict, during which time Plaintiff did not make any effort to obtain the required Certificate.  Plaintiff presented no evidence on the capacity issue at trial, nor could it since it did not comply with the statute until three weeks later. Further, at the conclusion of the trial Plaintiff allowed the record to close instead of requesting that it be kept open to allow time to obtain and offer into evidence its Certificate of Registration.  Plaintiff only submitted its registration as a part of its rebuttal to Defendant’s Motion for Judgment N.O.V.   The trial court denied Defendant’s Motion finding that submitting the certificate during post-trial proceedings was permissible. It entered judgment against Defendant in the amount of nearly $300,000.00.

On appeal, the Superior Court reversed the lower court and remanded for entry of Judgment N.O.V. in favor of the Defendant. Holding that registration is an absolute pre-requisite for a foreign Plaintiff doing business in Pennsylvania to maintain a suit and recover damages, the Court further reasoned that the after-acquired certificate could not be accepted during post-trial proceedings, nor could the record be re-opened to accept it because it was evidence that could and should have been presented during trial.  The Court further noted that the issue of lack of capacity to sue may be raised either by Preliminary Objection or, as was done here, by Answer and New Matter and cautioned that failure to do either waives the defense. 

However, the question remains, is there an earlier time period at which waiver may attach? Notwithstanding Pa.R.C.P. 1028, there may be. In International Inventors Incorporated, East v. Berger, 363 A.2d 1262 (Pa. Super. 1976) the Plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction and damages. There the Defendant properly raised the issue of Plaintiff’s incapacity at the preliminary injunction hearing but the preliminary injunction was nevertheless granted.  On appeal, the Superior Court held this was error.  The Court explained that the trial court should have denied Plaintiff’s request for an injunction, but should also have stayed the proceedings to give Plaintiff an opportunity to register and thereby cure its lack of capacity.  Instead, the Court granted the injunction and is so doing decided “an issue” (i.e. injunctive relief) in the case and thereby allowed Plaintiff to “maintain a suit” in violation of the statute. The Court reversed the grant of the injunction.  Although Berger analyzed the issue of timeliness in the context of the Plaintiff’s compliance with registration requirements, the Court’s reasoning also supports the argument that a Defendant, who does not raise the capacity issue prior to preliminary injunctive relief being granted, similarly may have waived the issue for the life of the suit even though the time for responsive pleadings under the Rules of Civil Procedure had not expired. Thus, while the question of the Plaintiff’s capacity may not be at the forefront of case strategy analysis, Berger and Drake are a caution to counsel that the issue cannot be ignored.

Commercial lenders in Pennsylvania await action by the legislature to fix what appears to be an unintended byproduct of recent amendments to the Pennsylvania Probate, Estate and Fiduciaries (PEF) Code that went into effect earlier this year. You may be wondering what a statute that generally applies to trust and estate matters has to do with commercial lending transactions. The answer is that the recent changes applicable to powers of attorney generally could be interpreted to apply to powers of attorney granted in commercial loan documents, leases and other contracts (such as those granted in connection with confession of judgment clauses and certain other remedies). Historically, these statutory provisions did not apply to commercial agreements. It appears that the legislature was focusing on trust and estate documents when enacting this legislation and didn’t understand the impact of these amendments on commercial transactions.

These amendments are troubling from a lender’s perspective because they require that an agent must “act in accordance with the principal’s reasonable expectations to the extent actually known by the agent and, otherwise, in the principal’s best interest.” In a commercial loan transaction, the agent is the lender and the principal is the borrower, so the tension is obvious: a lender that is foreclosing on property, confessing judgment, collecting rents, or exercising Article 9 remedies  is not likely to be acting in the best interest of the borrower.

Pennsylvania House Bill #665 would amend the PEF Code to clarify that the power of attorney requirements do not apply to commercial transactions. This bill is presently in the Senate Judiciary Committee. Until this bill becomes law, lenders should consider making the following adjustments to commercial loan documents containing powers of attorney (typically these include documents with confessions of judgment, security agreements, assignments of rent, and mortgages):

• Include an acknowledgement by the borrower that its reasonable expectations include confession of judgment, foreclosure and other actions typically taken by a lender under the power of attorney;

• Include a waiver of the duties imposed by the PEF Code; and

• Add a notary page.

By Thomas P. Donnelly, Esquire Reprinted with permission from the May 29, 2015 issue of The Legal Intelligencer. (c) 2015 ALM Media Properties. Further duplication without permission is prohibited.

Confidentiality agreements have become commonplace in commercial litigation.  The purpose of a confidentiality agreement as the protection from disclosure of either private personal or sensitive business information which gives a party a competitive advantage is certainly a noble one and one which mandates an agreement against such disclosure in a wide variety of circumstances.  Often, the parties seek the imprimatur of the court by requesting the court adopt the agreement of the parties as an order thereby incorporating the court’s power to impose sanctions in the event of breach.  The entry of such an order, whether intentionally or as an unintended consequence,  may change the nature of a third party, foreign to the dispute with respect to which the confidentiality order was entered, to obtain information produced in the prior litigation.  

Federal law (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) prohibits, among other matters, a covered employer, from discriminating against an employee because of such individual’s sex.  Generally, a private employer with 15 or more employees, engaging in interstate commerce, is covered by Title VII.  The Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) passed in 1978, added discrimination based on “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions” to this prohibition.

The PDA also provides that employers are required to treat  “women affected by  pregnancy… the same for all employment-related  purposes … as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work” .

In the recent case of Young v. UPS, the Supreme Court, in interpreting the provision above, announced a new test for analyzing pregnancy discrimination claims. The relevant facts of the case are as follows:

Plaintiff Young worked as a part-time driver for defendant United Parcel Service (UPS). Her duties included pickup and delivery of packages. While employed by UPS she became pregnant and was told by her doctor that she should not lift more than 20 pounds during her first 20 weeks of pregnancy and no more than 10 pounds thereafter. Drivers in Young’s position were required to lift up to 70 pounds. UPS therefore advised Young that she could not work while under a lifting restriction. As a result Young remained home without pay during most of her pregnancy and ultimately lost her employee medical coverage.

By Patricia C. Collins, Esquire, Reprinted with permission from the March 23, 2015 issue of The Legal Intelligencer. (c) 2015 ALM Media Properties. Further duplication without permission is prohibited.

Recently, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in Mathis v. Christian Heating and Air Conditioning, Inc., 13-3747 (March 12, 2015), examined the effect of factual findings in unemployment compensation proceedings in Pennsylvania on discrimination claims filed in federal court.  The conclusion?  The discrimination case is a “do over,” and nothing determined by the tribunal (including the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review and the Commonwealth Court) will collaterally estop either party, presumably, from taking a contrary position in the subsequent wrongful termination suit. 

 The facts are these:  Mr. Mathis was employed at Christian Heating and Air Conditioning (“Christian Heating”) for nearly two years.  During that time, Mr. Mathis had placed black tape over part of his identification badge.  The objectionable part of the card professed the company’s mission statement to, inter alia, run the business in a way that was “pleasing to the lord [sic]….”  Mr. Mathis’s supervisor and the owner of the business required him to remove the tape from the back of his badge.  Mr. Mathis refused to do so, and contended that he was terminated as a result. 

Arbitration - A Skeptic's Admission

Written by Thomas P. Donnelly Friday, December 05 2014 16:03

By Thomas P. Donnelly, Esquire, Reprinted with permission from the November 24, 2014 issue of The Legal Intelligencer. (c) 2014 ALM Media Properties. Further duplication without permission is prohibited.

I do not generally characterize myself as a fan of arbitration.  While proponents argue arbitration is a superior form of dispute resolution and more efficient than litigation, my personal experience in the representation of privately held businesses and individuals is otherwise.  In many situations, the sheer cost to initiate an arbitration proceeding may be prohibitive.  For a claimant, even if that initial cost is not an effective deterrent, the budget of ongoing hourly fees required of a qualified arbitrator in addition to the parties’ own anticipated legal fees, can quickly impair the potential recovery. For a Respondent, many times the cost of proceeding was not considered at the time of execution of an agreement which compels arbitration; thus the obligation to make payment for a service technically rendered by the courts without cost comes as a surprise. In either case, the parties must realize that at arbitration each is compensating not only its own lawyer, but, at least partially, another lawyer and a private dispute resolution industry as well. While arguably profitable for the legal profession, the realities of proceeding can result in difficult client discussions.

The above being said, there are situations where arbitration clauses can be of substantive, procedural and, consequently, financial benefit.  In such cases, even a skeptic of arbitration must recognize the benefits of the bargained for exchange which is an arbitration agreement.  Under the current state of the law, and given the trends in the enforcement of the right to contract, a carefully considered and artfully drafted arbitration agreement can be an essential aspect to certain business relationships and an important term of negotiation.

Employers should almost always include the broadest possible arbitration clause in any employment agreement and, generally, as a term of employment.  In most cases, an action arising in an employment situation concerns a claim raised by an employee, or worse, a class of employees against the employer.  The employer is generally a defendant.  In such cases, arbitration clauses can serve several functions.  First, an employee initiating the action must satisfy the initial fee if mandated by the prevailing agreement. As such fees are often determined by the amount at issue, the larger the claim, the higher the fee, and the greater deterrent toward commencement of the action.  As of November 1, 2014, the filing fee for the commencement of an American Arbitration Association claim involving more than one million but less than ten million dollars was $7,000.00.  Note there is no refund of the filing fee should the matter resolve.  Certainly, the requisite fee is a deterrent to the filing of a border line claim, but could also be a deterrent to a claimant’s joinder of additional even less viable claims which include different damage components.  Under any circumstances, the employee faces an early branch to the decision tree.

The flexibility of arbitration clauses within employment agreements may prove even more critical.  With careful drafting, an employer can effectively insulate itself from certain employment related class actions.   In Quillion v. Tenet HealthSystem Philadelphia, Inc. the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit compelled arbitration of a Fair Labor Standards Act claim and, more importantly, declined to strike down a provision of an employment agreement requiring such claims be brought on an individual basis precluding proceedings as a class.  The Quillion Court indicated that such a class action waiver was consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act and suggested in the strongest of terms that Pennsylvania’s preclusion of class action waiver in the employment context was preempted by Federal Law.  Certainly, the equities of any such situation, including preservation of remedies and additional recovery of fees and costs are important to the court’s inquiry, but the current trend is to support the rights of the parties to contract, even to their own peril.

The flexibility of the arbitration agreement also allows for exclusions from the scope and reservation of certain matters for litigation.  Matters of equity such as enforcement of restrictions against competition or solicitation can be reserved for the courts, thereby preserving immediate access to judicial process for enforcement of employer remedies.  Interestingly, the reverse may not necessarily be true.  The Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas recently dismissed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking a judicial determination voiding certain restrictions against competition determining that such equity claim was within the scope of the arbitration agreement and, therefore, for the arbitrator to decide.                 

Arbitration also plays a vital role in the ever broadening world economy.  In 2014, international business is the norm rather than the exception.  The courts of the United States and the signatories to the New York Convention on Arbitration have routinely enforced arbitration clauses establishing the parameters of dispute resolution as consistent with the parties’ right to contract.  Critically, the arbitration clause can protect a company operating in this country from the many pitfalls, incremental expenses and inconsistencies of litigating in a foreign country or even against a sovereign nation in its own judicial system by selecting a choice of law and a situs of the arbitration proceeding.  Such forum selection also provides a certain substantive component not only as to applicable law, but also in the qualification of fact finders as the roles of qualified arbitrators available for commercial disputes continue to grow.   Finally, arbitration may be preferable to litigation in the United States District Courts as the parties may be granted greater flexibility and input to the development of the schedule of proceedings rather than subject to the rule of the federal judge, who may or may not be familiar with often complex substantive issues.           Finally, arbitration may also be preferable in any relationship where confidentiality is key.  In some cases, the simple fact of a public filing is of concern.  In many others, the factual allegations of a complaint, even if eventually proven unfounded, can be damaging.  While an arbitration clause cannot prevent a claimant from filing an initial public complaint in court, an enforceable arbitration clause can bring an abrupt end to the public aspect of the dispute.

The courts remain the preferred forum for dispute resolution in many circumstances.  However, with the growing trend of contract enforcement to the terms of arbitration agreements even a skeptic must admit that the inclusion of an arbitration clause in certain circumstances can provide a substantive advantage and dramatically impact the landscape of dispute resolution to your client’s benefit.

Blogger Bios

  • Alan Wandalowski Alan Wandalowski
    Alan concentrates his practice in Estate Planning, Estate Administration, Elder Law, Estate…
  • Bill MacMinn Bill MacMinn
    Bill concentrates his practice in the area of litigation, including Commercial Litigation,…
  • Christopher D. Wagner Christopher D. Wagner
    Christopher Wagner is an experienced and results-driven business law attorney with a comprehensive understanding…
  • Elaine T. Yandrisevits Elaine T. Yandrisevits
    As an estate planning attorney, Elaine Yandrisevits is committed to guiding individuals…
  • Elizabeth J. Fineman Elizabeth J. Fineman
    Elizabeth Fineman concentrates her practice on domestic relations matters and handles a…
  • Gabriel Montemuro Gabriel Montemuro
    Gabe’s practice focuses on litigation, including commercial litigation, personal injury, estate and…
  • Jessica A. Pritchard Jessica A. Pritchard
    Jessica A. Pritchard, focuses her practice exclusively in the area of family…
  • Joanne Murray Joanne Murray
    Joanne concentrates her practice in the areas of Business Law, Business Transactions,…
  • Michael Klimpl Michael Klimpl
    Michael’s practice areas include Real Estate, Municipal Law, Zoning and Land Use, Employment…
  • Michael W. Mills Michael W. Mills
    Mike is devoted to helping businesses build value and improve working capital,…
  • Patricia Collins Patricia Collins
    Patty has been practicing law since 1996 in the areas of Employment…
  • Peter J. Smith Peter J. Smith
    Pete is a business lawyer and trusted partner to his corporate clients…
  • Stephanie M. Shortall Stephanie M. Shortall
    Throughout her career, Stephanie has developed a practice focused on advising closely…
  • Susan Maslow Susan Maslow
    Sue concentrates her practice primarily in general corporate transactional work and finance…
  • Thomas P. Donnelly Thomas P. Donnelly
    Tom’s practice focuses on commercial litigation and transactions. In litigation, Tom represents…