Employers frequently want to attract new, super-talented management to an existing Company, or potentially worse, have already promised to give one or more trusted and loyal current employees equity as part of their compensation package as soon as the time is right.  Unfortunately, this is easier said than safely done. 

Clearly, equity can be a powerful, seemingly low-cost form of compensation and motivation.  Having your most valued employees vested in something beyond their pay check certainly seems like a fine idea.  If the Company does well, the employee shares in that growth in the form of annual distributions or a buy-out upon death, disability, retirement or other termination of employment.  So, what do I have against such an idea?

My heart inevitably sinks when a client asks the ever popular question “What form of legal entity would be best for my for-profit enterprise?” The entrepreneur’s excitement is contagious but answering is never easy.  There are so many variables that determine where a start-up might end up no matter how researched the assumptions and projections might be.  And yet, a choice has to be made. 

For the growing number of social entrepreneurs, it has become even more nuanced.  There are three new legal forms emerging to satisfy the “Impact Investment Revolution” in our midst (the Flexible Purpose Corporation, the Benefit Corporation and the Low-Profit Limited Liability Company or L3C), and Illinois is considering the creation of a fourth, the Benefit L3C.  While each is designed to accommodate ventures that pursue social and environmental benefits attractive to impact investors, social entrepreneurs should consider a variety of factors before using the traditional LLC or corporation.

Summarizing the similarities and differences of each of the new legal forms is no straightforward task.  Each state that has adopted one or more of the alternative new forms has slightly different requirements and there is no real case law to date analyzing how state specific legislation is to be interpreted since these legal forms are so new. 

In general, the Flexible Purpose Corporation permits the founders of a for profit corporation to establish a blend of business and charitable or social objectives that are not profit maximization or asset growth oriented.  The board and management of the Flexible Purpose Corporation are then charged to act with those blended objectives in mind and to report to the shareholders on its success or failure in achieving them. 

The Benefit Corporation differs slightly in that it is a for profit entity that is required to advance a general public benefit in addition to any other purposes adopted as a business corporation.  The Benefit Corporation may also have as a purpose the creation of one or more specific public benefits.  The directors have an affirmative duty to consider the effects of their decisions on all of the corporation’s constituencies (shareholders, customers, suppliers, the environment, the community) and an annual benefit report prepared by an independent third party describing efforts to create the public benefit during the preceding year must be filed with the Department of State and distributed to shareholders.

In contrast, an L3C is usually formed to create a presumption of eligibility for program related investments (PRIs) from one or more foundations or to lock in a charitable mission when the founders have a set of investors who will support that mission.  See my earlier post “Private Foundations and New Regulations Regarding Program-Related Investments”.  The L3C is, by definition, a low-profit limited liability company which significantly furthers the accomplishment of one or more charitable or educational purposes within the meaning of Section 170(c)(2)(B) of the IRS Code of 1986, as amended.  No significant purpose of the L3C can be the production of income,  the appreciation of property or one or more political or legislative agendum within the meaning of Section 170(c)(2)(D) of the IRS Code of 1986, as amended. 

The L3C therefore goes further than the Flexible Purpose Corporation or the Benefit Corporation in that both of those are set up to be money-making enterprises that also have social or charitable mission(s). The L3C can operate a business but producing income or maximizing appreciation of assets cannot be a significant purpose of the venture and if it becomes clear after formation that income or appreciation is the focus, the L3C will immediately cease to exist as a low-profit LLC although it will continue to exist as a limited liability company.

Note that “B Corporations” are not a corporate form but rather a certification mark available to all three of the above forms and even traditional for profit corporations.  The certification or brand can be obtained from the nonprofit organization called B Lab and requires achieving a specific score after the B Lab evaluation of a variety of factors including the entity’s treatment of its employees and successful evaluation of socially responsible goals.  See http://www.bcorporation.net for more information on B corporations.  

With the above in mind, reverting to the age old “Who”, “What”, “Where”, “When” and “Why” analysis is probably the best way to analyze the alternatives.  Throwing in a “How” or two will help even more.

Looking at the “who”, entrepreneurs, investors and consumers each have characteristics that may make one choice unavailable or at least inappropriate.  For example, if the founding principals consist of one or more non-profit corporations rather than individuals, a Benefit Corporation may be desired although such an entity would be unable to elect pass through “S” status which may prompt a closer examination of the L3C model.  If attracting foundation PRIs is a large part of the business plan, that too might suggest that the L3C is the proper vehicle. In contrast, if the initial or anticipated future investors articulate the desire to consistently build profits along with a material positive impact on society or the environment, the L3C requirement for “low-profit” expectations will be violated and the L3C status possibly challenged.  The Benefit Corporation would be a better choice for such investors especially where enough time has simply not elapsed for anyone to determine how low the “low profit” requirement really is.

The “what” and the “where” is a close examination of the intended business activities and cross border implications, if any.  Some activities are more fundamentally socially or environmentally beneficial than others and some are clearly charitable at their core.   At the same time, while you can form a legal entity anywhere that the chosen structure is permitted and file for authority to do business in any state of operation, PRIs, bonds and grant programs are often geographically specific. 

“When” is a determination of the planned exit of either the founders or specific staged investors which may suggest starting out as one kind of entity and evolving over time into another kind of entity which is permitted in most states if the requisite shareholder/member consent is obtained. The transition is not intended to be as difficult as a non-profit to for profit transformation (which, in Pennsylvania, require Attorney General and Orphans’ Court participation).   “Why” is really another examination of the social/environmental/charitable mission and the expectations of all principals along with the individuals or programs the principals intend to benefit with the new endeavor.  And, finally, an old fashioned projection of just “how” much money is needed at different junctures of the anticipated growth cycle is key. 

LawForChange at http://www.lawforchange.org  features some interesting content on the variety of legal structures available on a state by state basis.  There are certainly pros and cons of using each structure and I sincerely wish you well in your efforts to choose which will be best.  Forget what I said at the beginning of this post and feel free to call me if I can be of any help. 

Restrictions against competition are frequently included in employment agreements and agreements for the sale of business assets or stock.  The restriction against competition is designed to secure a time period for the employer or buyer of business assets, as the case may be, during which the employer/buyer is free from competition for a departed employee or seller so as to facilitate the transition and better protect their own business assets and customer relationships.  If properly drafted and implemented, restrictions against competition are enforceable under Pennsylvania law.

The primary method of enforcement in the event of breach is a preliminary injunction in equity.  In order to prevail on a petition for preliminary injunction, a petitioner must demonstrate several factors including (1) the need to prevent irreparable harm which cannot be compensated by money damages, (2) that more harm will result from the denial of the preliminary injunction than from granting same, (3) that the injunction will restore the parties to the status quo, (4) the likelihood of success on the merits, (5) that the injunction is designed to abate the offending activity, and (6) that the injunction will not negatively impact public policy.   In most cases the issues of likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm incapable of compensation with money damages represent the contested issues.

In Bucks County, the petition for preliminary injunction must be accompanied by a verified complaint and an order for hearing.  The petition is often, though not always, heard by the initial pre-trial judge assigned to the case at the time of filing.  Court administration reviews all petitions for preliminary injunction and assigns the presiding judge, courtroom and date for evidence to be taken.  The order for hearing is an essential aspect of the petition; without it, no hearing will be scheduled.

The petitioner in any injunction matter bears a heavy burden.  Adequate evidence as to the need for enforcement of the covenant, the potential irreparable harm and right to relief must be presented.  Because the entry of injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy, the evidence must be clear and persuasive.  In employment and business asset transfer cases, the language of the restriction in the applicable agreements must be constrained to those aspects of competition which are reasonably necessary for the protection of the employer/buyer.  For example, a covenant which is overbroad in terms of geography, time or scope will not be enforced.

Preliminary injunctive relief may be acquired in the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas if supported by the underlying agreement and if properly perfected under the practices and procedures employed in the County.

Just when minority owners of Delaware LLCs thought that the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act (the “Act”) protected them from overreaching managers, along comes the Delaware Supreme Court to say “better get it in writing.” It appears that practitioners longing for certainty will have to wait until the Delaware legislature steps in and revises the statute.

The Delaware Supreme Court recently published an opinion in a case involving a Delaware LLC (Gatz Properties, LLC) that was the manager of another LLC (Peconic Bay, LLC). Gatz Properties is managed and controlled by William Gatz, and the Gatz family and their affiliates owned controlling equity interests in Peconic Bay. They also owned real estate that was leased to Peconic Bay, which in turn subleased the property to a national golf course operator. The golf course proved to be unprofitable because it was poorly managed, and Mr. Katz anticipated that the sublease would be terminated. He decided to acquire the sublease and Peconic Bay’s other assets for himself. Consequently, he foiled the efforts of a third party to buy the sublease rights. He then engaged a valuation expert to appraise the property but did not provide the expert with information about the prior third party offers or tell the expert that the golf course’s unattractive financials were the result of its being mismanaged. Not surprisingly, the resulting appraisal showed that Peconic Bay had no net positive value. Next, Mr. Katz hired an auctioneer with no experience in the golf course industry to sell the golf course business. After lackluster advertising for the auction, Mr. Katz was the sole bidder and acquired the property for $50,000 plus the assumption of debt. Peconic Bay’s minority members brought suit in the Delaware Court of Chancery, alleging that Mr. Katz had breached his fiduciary duties to them. The Court of Chancery held that Gatz had breached both his contractual and statutory duties to the minority members, and Gatz appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court.

The Delaware Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Chancery that the LLC agreement’s clear language prohibited self-dealing without the consent of 2/3 of the minority owners, and Mr. Gatz testified on several occasions that he understood that Gatz Properties owned fiduciary duties to the minority members. The Court also upheld the lower court’s finding that Gatz breached this duty.

Moving on to whether Gatz breached a statutory duty under the Act, the Court noted that it was “improvident and unnecessary” for the Court of Chancery to decide that the Act imposed “default” fiduciary duties on managers where the LLC agreement is silent because, in the case at bar, the issue could be decided by interpreting the text of the LLC agreement. Additionally, no litigant asked that the lower court resolve the issue by interpreting the Act. Another concern for the Court was the lower court’s suggestion that its statutory interpretation should withstand scrutiny because practitioners rely on its rulings. The Court remarked that, as the highest court in Delaware, it was not bound to follow the lower court’s decisions. The Court rebuked the lower court for using the case at hand as a “platform to propagate [its] world views on issues not presented.” The Court concluded its reprimand by stating that because the issue of whether the Act imposes default fiduciary duties is one on which reasonable minds can differ, the matter should be left to the legislature to clarify.

Following the decision in Gatz Properties, equity holders in Delaware manager-managed LLCs would be prudent to clearly identify in the LLC agreement which fiduciary duties are intended to apply to their managers. Given the Court’s position that the issue is a matter for the legislature (not the courts) to decide, practitioners will be monitoring the activities of the legislature to see if it takes up the gauntlet.

As the calendar year comes to a close, all corporate entities, profit and nonprofit, look to their books and make end of year decisions to best avoid the pitfalls of the clear and concise (NOT!) Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”).  Private foundations have a unique challenge in their efforts to avoid excise taxes which are imposed on them, as well as their managers, in accordance with Section 4944(a)(1) of the Code if it is found that such foundations made investments that jeopardize the private foundation’s exempt purposes.  Such “jeopardizing investments” generally occur when foundation managers fail to exercise ordinary business care and prudence, under the facts and circumstances prevailing at the time of making the investment, in providing for the long and short term financial needs of the private foundation.

On May 21, 2012 the Service published proposed regulations that provide nine new examples of types of private foundation investments that qualify as Program Related Investments (“PRIs”).  PRIs are not classified as investments which jeopardize the carrying out of exempt purposes of a private foundation because they possess the following characteristics:

    a. have as the primary purpose the accomplishment of one or more charitable or educational purposes defined by Section 170(c)(2)(B) of the Code;
    b. do not have as a significant purpose the production of income or the appreciation of property; and
    c. do not further one or more of the purposes described in Section 170(c)(2)(D) of the Code (relating to prohibited political activities and lobbying).

To be certain both the foundation and the recipient of the PRI are on the same page (and to also prove the foundation is exercising “expenditure responsibility” to the Internal Revenue Service), a private foundation must secure a written commitment from the recipient of the PRI which specifies the purpose of the investment and contains an agreement by the organization:

    a. to use all amounts received only for the purposes of the investment and to repay any amount not used for these purposes back to the foundation, provided that, for equity investments, the repayment is within the limitations concerning distributions to holders of equity;
    b. to submit, at least once a year, a full and complete financial report together with a statement that it has complied with the terms of the investment;
    c. to keep adequate books and records and to make them available to the private foundation; and
    d. not to use any of the funds to carry on propaganda, influence legislation, influence the outcome of any public elections, carry on voter registration drives or make grants that do not comply with the requirements regarding individual grants or expenditure responsibility. 

Examples of acceptable PRIs in the proposed new regulations are based on published guidance and on financial structures that had previously been approved in private letter rulings. The regulations do not modify the existing regulation but illustrate certain principles and current investment practices.  Where the examples in the older regulations focused on domestic situations principally involving economically disadvantaged individuals in deteriorated urban areas, the new examples include a broader range of opportunities that might be presented to a private foundation.

The new examples demonstrate that a PRI may accomplish a variety of charitable purposes, such as advancing science, combating environmental deterioration and promoting the arts.  Several examples also demonstrate that an investment that funds activities in one or more foreign countries, including investments that alleviate the impact of a natural disaster or that fund educational programs for individuals in poverty, may further the accomplishment of charitable purposes and qualify as a PRI.  One example specifically illustrates that the existence of a high potential rate of return on an investment does not, by itself, prevent the investment from qualifying as a PRI.  Another illustrates that a private foundation’s acquisition of an equity position in conjunction with making a loan does not necessarily prevent the investment from qualifying as a PRI and two examples illustrate that the private foundation’s provision of credit enhancement (such as a deposit agreement or a guarantee) can qualify as a PRI. 

As a result of the new examples, the Service has made it clear that the recipients of PRIs do not need to be within a charitable class if they are the instruments for furthering a charitable purpose. 
Thus, an investment in a for-profit that develops new drugs may qualify as a PRI if the for-profit business agrees to use the investment to develop a vaccine distributed to impoverished individuals at an affordable cost. Similarly, the purchase of equity in a benefit corporation or L3C that engages in the collection of recyclable solid waste or a below market rate loan to allow a social welfare organization formed to promote the arts purchase a large exhibition space may each also qualify for a PRI from the right foundation.

The new regulations should provide private foundation boards and managers in the second half of 2012 with the additional assurance they needed to make PRIs not only to traditional non-profits but to for-profit, benefit corporations and L3Cs with an articulated social enterprise consistent with the foundation’s exempt activities. Rejecting traditional boundaries between nonprofit and for-profit sectors, the PRI regulations can help encourage the most creative business minds achieve ‘double bottom line’ (financial and social) and sometimes ‘triple bottom line’ (financial, social and environmental) results.  By expanding the base for PRIs, we move beyond traditional conception of society as divided neatly into three sectors (business, nonprofit and government) help develop a new forth sector that encompasses elements of both business and nonprofit sectors. 

Often, in the business context, agreements contain representations and warranties of the parties to the agreement.  The representations and warranties can range from general items such as business forms and the payment of taxes, to more specific items, such as the accuracy and reliability of financial information.  While such representations and warranties are commonplace in business agreements, their importance should not be overlooked.

Under Pennsylvania law, when performance of a duty under contract is due, any non-performance is a breach.  If a breach constitutes a material failure of performance, the non-breaching party is discharged from its duties under the contract.  A party who has materially breached a contract may not complain if the other party refuses to perform.  In other words, a material breach of contract may excuse performance by the non-performing party.

In the context of representations and warranties contained in a business agreement, should the representations and warranties contained in the agreement prove to be false, the party to whom the representations and warranties were made may raise the falsity of the representations and warranties to excuse further performance of any contractual obligations under the agreement.  Such a circumstance could spell disaster in the business context – particularly in a case where the payment of money is due at some time after closing.

Pennsylvania courts impose an element of materiality to the breach of a representation or warranty.  The elements of materiality under Pennsylvania law include the extent to which an injured party will be deprived of the benefit which he reasonably expected, the extent to which the injured party may be adequately compensated for that part of the benefit of which he will be deprived, the likelihood that the party failing to perform or offer to perform will cure, and the extent to which the party failing to perform comports with the standards of good faith and fair dealing.

Accordingly, representations and warranties contained in an agreement should not be taken lightly, but should be made with any eye toward the potential ramifications in the event of breach.

Two guys are sitting at a bar discussing how they are going to quit their current jobs and start their own business. A lawyer sits next to them, overhears their happy ramblings and pipes in, as lawyers always do, that their mutual promise to devote 100% of their working energy to the new biz has to be reduced to writing. You know this joke, right?

Well, maybe not, and maybe it’s not such a knee slapper anyway. Under Delaware’s Limited Liability Company Act (the “Act”), a person may be admitted to a LLC as a member and may receive a LLC interest without making a contribution or being obligated to make a contribution to the LLC. If an interest in a LLC is to be issued in exchange for cash, tangible or intangible property, services rendered or a promissory note or obligation to contribute one or more of these items, however, the LLC’s operating agreement can and should, identify that obligation. The Act goes further and makes it clear that the operating agreement may provide that a member who fails to perform in accordance with, or to comply with the terms and conditions of, the operating agreement shall be subject to specified penalties or consequences, When a member fails to make any contribution that the member is obligated to make, the operating agreement can provide that such penalty or consequence take the form of reducing or eliminating the defaulting member’s proportionate interest in a LLC, subordinating the member’s interest to that of nondefaulting members, a forfeiture of that interest, or a fixing of the value of his or her interest by appraisal or by formula with a forced redemption or sale of the LLC interest at such value.

If only our clients made it easy on us by letting us write agreements with such detail! A more common scenario is the member who wants us to get rid of the 50% member, formerly a dear buddy, who walked out the door for whatever reason after a few months (or, even worse, walks in and plays on the computer all day doing nothing that needs to be done). Unfortunately, without an operating agreement that clearly identifies expectations with respect to contributions of services and remedies for breach, it is a challenge to argue the defaulting member forfeits his or her interest for failure of consideration as s/he might for failure to “pay” for the interest with cash or property.

While I continue to look out for case law in support of the idea of forfeiture in the context of LLCs, a recent Kansas case did address alternative remedies for breach of obligations with respect to contributions of cash.   In Canyon Creek Development, LLC v Fox, the court struggled with the appropriate remedy available to a LLC when a member failed to satisfy a required capital call. The defaulting member, Fox, argued that he should not be held personally liable for the nonpayment of a post-formation capital contribution where the only remedy set forth in the operating agreement was a reduction of his ownership interest. Interpreting a statute that appears to be similar to the Act, the court ultimately agreed with Fox, making a distinction between the initial contributions (which could be in the form of cash or services, measured by their “net fair market value”) and later capital infusions which had to be in cash (unless the manager otherwise consented). The court concluded that the statutory default rule that a member is obligated to perform any promise to contribute cash or property or perform services, even if a member is unable to perform, supports the proposition that a member may be required, at the option of the LLC, to contribute an amount of cash equal to the agreed value of any initial, unmade, contribution. The court stated this was the law even where the LLC may have other rights against the noncontributing member under the operating agreement or other law. Turning to subsequent capital calls, however, the court found it significant that the remedy of cash damages, the most fundamental remedy for breach of contract, was conspicuously absent from the provisions of the operating agreement. Thus, the court concluded that the failure to include such a fundamental remedy as damages when a member fails to contribute additional capital after the LLC’s initial capitalization was not an oversight, but rather expressed a clear intent that damages are not recoverable from a member who failed to contribute additional capital after the venture was up and running. In the Fox case, the right to reduce the breaching member’s LLC interest was all that the LLC could do to punish the breaching member. No divorce, but better than a non-collectable judgment for a sum certain from my perspective.

It is not uncommon for a minority shareholder to cry foul when the corporation is sold and the shareholder believes he received less than fair value for his shares. Such claims often result in shareholder oppression suits, with the majority shareholder accused of having breached a fiduciary duty to the minority owner. Now it seems that controlling shareholders of even privately held corporations have another potential adversary: the Securities Exchange Commission. The SEC recently sued Stiefel Laboratories and its then-controlling shareholder and CEO Charles Stiefel, alleging that they defrauded current and former employee shareholders out of more than $110 million by buying back shares in the company at undervalued prices prior to the sale of the company to GlaxoSmithKline PLC.

The complaint alleges that the defendants misled the employee shareholders, who had acquired the shares as part of a stock bonus plan, by concealing material information about the potential acquisition of the company by GlaxoSmithKline. Information regarding several offers from private equity firms to acquire stock in the company at a higher price than the valuation provided to employees was also allegedly withheld from employees. The complaint further asserts that the valuation that the company provided to employees was prepared by an unqualified accountant who used flawed methodology. Adding insult to injury, a 35% discount incorporated into the valuation was not disclosed to the employees.

The complaint cites, among other things, the company's repurchase of 800 shares from employees at a price equal to $16,469 per share in the months leading up to the sale to GlaxoSmithKline, which acquired the company for $68,000 per share. As a result of the reduced number of outstanding shares, the remaining shareholders (consisting mostly of Stiefel family members) received a windfall.

The SEC warns that privately held companies and their officers should be aware that federal securities laws are intended to protect all shareholders, regardless of whether they acquire their shares in a private transaction such as a stock bonus plan or on a public market. Corporate officers in corporations with stock bonus plans should take care to obtain appropriate valuations to support stock repurchases from accredited professionals using commonly accepted valuation methodologies. Stock option plans and corresponding summary plan descriptions should be carefully reviewed, with a particular focus on their stock repurchase provisions. All material facts must be fully disclosed to plan participants in a timely manner.

To avoid post-transaction cries of foul play from former shareholders, we often include “tail” provisions that allow the former shareholders to enjoy the same economic benefit of a major company transaction such as a sale or merger that follows the sale of their shares. Such provisions are usually of limited duration (e.g., twelve months). This protects the company and senior management from claims like those raised by Stiefel Laboratories employees after the expiration of the tail period.

Topics deemed “hot” in the context of mergers and acquisitions ebb and flow just as they do in all other aspects of legal study.  When I first started practicing in the early 80s, I remember being taught to carefully include any post transaction covenant not to compete in the sale document as well as in a stand-alone agreement between buyer and seller(s). This seemingly unnecessary duplication of the post transaction obligation imposed on the seller(s) was required to provide multiple legal arguments for enforcing and amortizing the obligation and drive up the aggregate sums payable to the seller(s).  Specific party agreement as to the allocation of the purchase price (and completion of Form 8594 for asset acquisitions) was deemed worthy of considerable negotiation.

Recent Tax Court and First and Ninth Circuit opinions, and this office’s own fourth quarter 2011 transactional work, seem to suggest the elusive covenant not to compete and personal goodwill have again become  important tools for tax planning purposes.  Who owns the goodwill is particularly relevant in the context of hospital purchases of physician practices where the fair market value of hard assets might not be enough to cover malpractice tail insurance let alone justify the physicians’ loss of control over their practice.
 
Under Section 197, certain intangibles must be amortized by the buyer, on a ratable basis, over a 15 year period beginning with the month in which such intangible is acquired. A Section 197 intangible includes “any covenant not to compete…entered into in connection with an acquisition (directly or indirectly) of an interest in a trade or business or substantial portion thereof.” But more and more courts refuse to enforce covenants not to compete in the context of the physician- patient relationship, concluding that such covenants are against public policy unless tailored to actually mean only non-solicitation.

Nevertheless, it has been common practice for business lawyers to continue to suggest that each physician in a group practice enter into an employment agreement or other entity document that imposes (or at least tries to impose) a covenant not to compete during and post-employment.  In the absence of such pre-existing non-compete and specific claim to ownership of patient records, however, the selling shareholders and not the entity are arguably possessed of “personal goodwill”, an intangible asset owned by the selling shareholders. To avoid the double tax imposed upon the sale by a C corporation,  maximize the benefits of a meaningful allocation of the purchase price in a sale transaction to intangibles or justify a larger signing bonus, it may be wise to reconsider owner non-compete provisions before the eminence of a sale transaction makes it too late to do so. 

Nobody wants a “Bad Actor” as part of its working group but, from the perspective of  the founder of a startup, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s proposed “bad actor” rules may wind up causing more injury than antidote. The good news is that the SEC is proposing amendments to its rules to implement Section 926 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act to disqualify securities offerings involving certain “felons and other ‘bad actors’” from reliance on the safe harbor from Securities Act registration provided by Rule 506 of Regulation D.  See 17 CFR Parts 230 and 239 (Release No.33-9211; File No. S7-21-11.  I agree with that effort but, since Rule 506 is one of the three exemptive rules for limited and private offerings under Regulation D, and by far the most popular, it is important that the definitions are carefully tailored.  Not all “disqualifying acts” are equal, and “covered persons” and the “bad actor” disqualification should apply only to issuer’s management and controlling equity holders rather than any holder of 10% or more of the entity’s equity.  And, even if those changes are not made, the reasonable investigation standard for determining whether “covered persons” are “bad actors” should be no more onerous than the current standard for accepting money from “accredited investors”. Without these changes to the proposed rules, the process of compliance will be beyond the budget and timeline of most startups.